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The perceived credibility of forward-looking
performance disclosures
VASILIKI ATHANASAKOUa∗ and KHALED HUSSAINEYb
aDepartment of Accounting, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK; bPlymouth Business School, Plymouth, UK
We investigate the credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures (FLPDs) in the
narrative sections of annual reports, as perceived by investors. Our proxy for these
disclosures is an index of statements about future performance. We ﬁnd that companies
issue more FLPDs when raising debt or conveying bad news in the ﬁnancial statements. In
the presence of these managerial incentives, investor reliance on FLPDs increases with the
quality of earnings reported in the audited ﬁnancial statements. Our results suggest that
ﬁrms derive a beneﬁt in terms of higher credibility for their narrative disclosures from
having a reputation for high quality earnings.
Keywords: forward-looking statements; voluntary disclosures; managerial incentives;
earnings quality
1. Introduction
We investigate the credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures (FLPDs) that managers
provide in annual reports, as perceived by investors. Our proxy for these disclosures is a score that
counts statements about future performance in the narrative sections of the reports. Regulator
interest in the content of these sections has grown in the belief that they improve the relevance
of corporate reporting (Beattie et al. 2004). Empirical evidence so far suggests that a higher fre-
quency of FLPDs does indeed correlate with stock prices that are more informative about future
earnings. However, as FLPDs are not immediately veriﬁable or auditable, managers may also use
them when they have incentives to be misleading or untruthful at the time of the disclosure. To
guard against misleading performance disclosures, investors may look for information quality
in the audited ﬁnancial statements. In this paper, we explore managerial incentives in providing
FLPDs, and investigate whether, in the presence of these incentives, investor reliance on FLPDs
increases with the quality of reported earnings.
Narrative sections in annual reports have been gaining increasing prominence. With annual
reports being released at regular intervals, theses narratives rank highly as an information
# 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
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source. We focus on UK annual report narrative sections that include FLPDs, e.g. Financial High-
lights, the Chairman’s Statement, the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer’s Review, the Business Review and
the Operating and Financial Review (OFR). FLPDs refer to information on expected payoffs from
current and future investment plans and from structural business changes that enables users to
predict a company’s future ﬁnancial performance. In the UK information about current and
future trading is typically given through such qualitative narrative statements, rather than
through quantitative management earnings forecasts (Brennan 1999, Schleicher and Walker
2010). As FLPDs are qualitative and non-time speciﬁc in nature (Clarkson et al. 1992, Clarkson
et al. 1994, Clatworthy and Jones 2003), it is harder for outsiders to effectively monitor their accu-
racy (Schleicher and Walker 2010, p. 271). This provides scope for assessing managerial incen-
tives underlying FLPDs and the use of safeguards by investors when relying on such soft and less
easily veriﬁable disclosures in the annual reports.
We ﬁrst investigate situational incentives that managers have when issuing FLPDs. By situa-
tional incentives, we mean incentives to open up about future performance triggered by speciﬁc
events or circumstances, e.g. debt or equity offerings and reporting of bad earnings news in the
ﬁnancial statements.1 We measure the frequency of FLPD using a score that counts the number of
FLPDs in annual report narrative sections, as developed by Hussainey et al. (2003). Our analysis
shows that controlling for other considerations (e.g. proprietary costs, ﬁrm size, analyst coverage
and forecast dispersion), managers issue more FLPDs when raising debt or reporting bad news in
the ﬁnancial statements (e.g. earnings declines, falling short of analyst forecasts or underperform-
ing industry peers).
We then investigate the credibility of FLPDs as perceived by investors. In the spirit of Jen-
nings (1987) and Mercer (2004), we assess the perceived credibility of FLPDs by the extent to
which investors view the FLPDs as ‘believable’. Prior research shows that FLPDs increase inves-
tor ability to anticipate future earnings (Section 2). We, therefore, measure the perceived credi-
bility of FLPDs by the extent to which investors rely on FLPDs to anticipate future earnings.
Our results show that while on average FLPDs increase the share price anticipation of future earn-
ings, investors do not rely on FLPDs of ﬁrms that issue debt or report bad news.
We then investigate whether investor reliance on FLPDs varies with earnings quality,
especially in the presence of situational incentives. Management credibility cues are useful to
investors in deciding whether to rely on FLPDs. As FLPDs are qualitative and therefore not
easily veriﬁable, it is difﬁcult to infer management forecasting reputation. In this case, managers’
reporting reputation reﬂected in earnings quality may be informative. By ‘earnings quality’ we
mean the precision of reported earnings in the audited ﬁnancial statements. Our results show
that investor reliance on FLPDs increases with reported earnings quality. In the presence of situa-
tional incentives, FLPDs help investors to re-assess information in contemporaneous earnings and
anticipate future earnings only when reported earnings are of high quality. This ﬁnding is sus-
tained when considering simpler earnings properties (e.g. earnings volatility), ﬁltering out the
variation of earnings quality related to business fundamentals, and controlling for other aspects
of the ﬁrm’s information environment (e.g. analyst following and forecast dispersion). We con-
clude that a ﬁrm’s reputation for high quality earnings affects the perceived credibility of its
FLPDs.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the literature examining the relevance of FLPDs. We demonstrate
that investors do not rely unconditionally on FLPDs. Investors rely on disclosures of ﬁrms with
higher earnings quality, especially when ﬁrms issue debt or report bad earnings news in the ﬁnan-
cial statements. The insights of our investigation are timely for policy-makers and regulators who
are currently considering ways to improve communication between companies and investors in
the annual report narratives (FASB 2013, FRC 2013). The stock market appears to use infor-
mation in the audited ﬁnancial statements in deciding whether to rely on these narratives. This
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signiﬁes a ﬁrst-order effect for the quality of reported earnings, as Francis et al. (2008) also high-
light, that might explain the lack of evidence of an unconditional positive association between
superior ﬁnancial communication strategies and investor conﬁdence (Peasnell et al. 2011). For
managers our evidence suggests that there is a beneﬁt in terms of credibility for their narrative
disclosures from having a reputation for high quality in reported earnings. This implies an
additional incentive for managers to invest in earnings quality as part of the ﬁrm’s reputational
capital. Finally, our study contributes to the literature on accounting and disclosure choices.
Our ﬁndings corroborate evidence on the interaction between reporting and disclosure choices
(Bagnoli and Watts 2007, Francis et al. 2008), providing additional insights into how investors
extract information from mandatory reporting to decide reliance on ‘softer’ FLPDs. Our evidence
reiterates the need to examine accounting and disclosure choices as part of a general reporting and
disclosure equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and devel-
ops our research hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 describes the
sample. Section 5 presents the main empirical results and additional analyses. Section 6
concludes.
2. Theoretical framework and prior research
Agency theory motivates voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry
(useful reviews can be found in Core 2001, Healy and Palepu 2001, Lundholm and Van Winkle
2006). Research on forward-looking disclosures has established such a role for management earn-
ings forecasts in press releases issued by US ﬁrms. The release of management forecasts is associ-
ated with meeting the analyst forecasts, seasoned equity offerings (SEO), low forecast errors and
low earnings volatility (Ruland et al. 1990, Baik and Jiang 2006). Prior studies also examine
forward-looking disclosures provided in annual reports and press releases. These studies, often
limited to a small sample size (Clatworthy and Jones 2003, Lakhal 2005, O’Sullivan et al.
2008), use the traditional content analysis approach to count the number of sentences containing
forward-looking information in the narrative sections. Research that has used computer software
to measure levels of FLPDs in the narratives of UK annual reports, as we do, has provided some
evidence on the agency considerations underlying such disclosures (Hussainey et al. 2003,
Schleicher et al. 2007, Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011).2 We build a framework of the factors
affecting the frequency of FLPDs that focuses on how earnings news in the audited ﬁnancial state-
ments induces managers to open up about the future in their annual report narratives. Our model
extends existing approaches by considering explicitly how managers’ strategic reporting incen-
tives affect the frequency of FLPDs. In the presence of such strategic reporting incentives, the
issue of the perceived credibility of FLPDs becomes crucial.
In examining the relevance of FLPDs, prior research has focused on the association of FLPDs
with future performance and the extent to which they help investors anticipate future earnings.
Clarkson et al. (1994, 1999) ﬁnd that both frequency of, and changes in, forward-looking disclos-
ures make corporate annual reports more informative about future performance.3 Similarly, Bryan
(1997) ﬁnds that reporting future operations and capital expenditure information in annual reports
is associated with future short-term performance. Barron et al. (1999) shed light on the effect of
forward-looking disclosures on capital markets, with evidence of a positive association between
such disclosures and the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. Bozzolan et al. (2009) study the
annual reports of Italian, German, French and Swiss ﬁrms cross-listed in the USA and ﬁnd that
forward-looking disclosures improve forecast accuracy and reduce analyst forecast dispersion.
Focusing on investors, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) show that soft information included in
the front end of the annual report narratives improve the return–earnings relation. Miller and
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Piotroski (2000) take this evidence further showing that forward-looking disclosures increase the
correlation of stock returns with the next period’s earnings. Similarly, Gelb and Zarowin (2002)
and Lundholm and Myers (2002) show that ﬁrms with higher Association for Investment Man-
agement Research (AIMR) disclosure scores help investors ‘bring the future forward’ as they
have a higher amount of future earnings news reﬂected in their current annual returns.4 Schleicher
and Walker (1999), Hussainey et al. (2003), Schleicher et al. (2007), Hussainey and Walker
(2009), and Muslu et al. (2012) also provide evidence that FLPDs result in stock returns incor-
porating future earnings in a more timely fashion. This line of research has not explicitly
addressed the credibility issue that arises from the non-veriﬁable nature of FLPDs in the UK.
Jennings (1987) argues that investor reaction to managerial disclosures is a function of the
credibility (‘believability’) of the disclosure. Two companies that are equally forthcoming
about future performance in their annual report narratives but not equally ‘believable’ may
elicit different responses from investors. Prior research identiﬁes management credibility as a
key factor affecting the credibility of management disclosures as the credibility of a message
depends on the credibility of the messenger (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979, Mercer 2004,
Kothari et al. 2009). Such research draws inferences mainly based on the analysis of quantitative
and largely veriﬁable information disclosed by management, the most common type being man-
agement earnings forecasts and proxies management credibility through forecast accuracy.5 With
management forecasts, accuracy can be assessed straightforwardly through subsequent ﬁnancial
statements. Monitoring the accuracy of FLPDs in the UK, however, is difﬁcult, given the quali-
tative nature of FLPDs. Schleicher and Walker (2010) and Schleicher (2012) highlight this issue
and provide evidence that ﬁrms with large impending earnings declines bias upwards the tone of
their FLPDs. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) ﬁnd that the chairman’s statement of unproﬁtable com-
panies is subject to impression management. This evidence raises suspicion over the role of
FLPDs especially in the presence of situational incentives. Demers and Vega (2011) suggest
that investor reliance on soft non-veriﬁable information depends on factors related to the ﬁrm’s
information environment. We complement this line of research in two ways. First, we investigate
investor reliance on FLPDs in the presence of situational incentives. Then, we examine whether
investor reliance on FLPDs varies with reported earnings quality, especially in the presence of
such incentives. We focus on earnings quality as a factor of the ﬁrm’s information environment,
as it is directly affected by managers, i.e. the ‘messengers’ of FLPDs.
Drawing from persuasion models, Mercer (2004) argues that investors are less likely to rely
on management disclosures when managers have incentives to be misleading or untruthful at the
time of the disclosure. While in the presence of situational incentives, managers may use FLPDs
to release their superior information, they enjoy greater beneﬁts and lower costs from providing
inaccurate disclosures. Koch (2002) claims this to be the case with ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial distress.
In a similar vein, Lang and Lundholm (2000) argue that higher disclosures before equity offerings
reﬂect managerial attempts to hype the stock rather than reduce information asymmetry, as this
disclosure is optimistically biased and leads to pre-offer price rises and post-offer price declines.
Thus, in the presence of situational incentives investors face a higher need for inside information,
but also higher uncertainty about the credibility of management disclosures. In these cases, man-
agement credibility cues are useful for deciding whether to rely on FLPDs. A historical measure
of managerial forecasting accuracy would be hard to derive due to the more qualitative and there-
fore less veriﬁable nature of FLPDs. In these cases, the quality of reported earnings in the audited
ﬁnancial statements may offer a useful proxy for management credibility, as it reﬂects manage-
ment’s reporting reputation and evidence suggests that it is aligned with disclosure quality
(Francis et al. 2008). If indeed investors rely on earnings quality to infer management credibility,
we would expect investor reliance on FLPDs to increase with earnings quality. This would par-
ticularly be the case in the presence of situational incentives where investors have higher
230 V. Athanasakou and K. Hussainey
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uncertainty about the credibility of management disclosures. Thus, we hypothesise that investor
reliance on FLPDs increases with reported earnings quality, especially in the presence of situa-
tional incentives.
3. Research design
3.1. Measuring forward-looking disclosures
3.1.1. FLPD score (FDSCORE)
To calculate our FLPD score, we use the scoring method developed in Hussainey et al. (2003,
pp. 276–82). The authors automate the generation of disclosure scores for large samples of
UK ﬁrms by using the QSR N6 text analysis software. We focus on annual report narratives,
as they are more likely to contain voluntary FLPDs, and on sections with at least one of the fol-
lowing headings: Financial Highlights, Summary Results, Chairman’s Statement, CEO’s Review,
OFR, Financial Review, Financial Director’s Report, Finance Review, Business Review and
Operating Review. All other sections of the annual report are excluded from our analysis. We
focus on performance indicators as they improve the stock market’s ability to anticipate future
earnings changes (Hussainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et al. 2007).
We construct our disclosure index in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we identify forward-
looking statements in the narratives by electronically searching the sections for a list of 35
forward-looking keywords such as accelerate, anticipate, await and coming (ﬁnancial) year(s).
Appendix 1 provides detailed lists of the keywords. We also include future year numbers in
the list of forward-looking keywords. In the second stage, we identify performance-related key-
words. We trace these keywords in sell-side analyst reports to represent the market’s view about
the ﬁrm’s disclosure quality.6 For each forward-looking statement in analyst reports, we identify
the key noun in the statement, e.g. proﬁtability, earnings per share (EPS), return and margin
(Appendix 1). In the third stage, we count the number of sentences that include at least one
forward-looking keyword and one performance keyword in the annual report narratives. Our
FLPDs index, FDSCORE, is the number of intersections divided by the total number of sentences
in the narrative sections and multiplied by 100. FDSCORE is bounded by 0 and 100. Our coding
scheme is arguably an improvement on binary coding as it counts the frequency of FLPDs in the
annual report, not merely their existence. Also scaling by the length of the narratives allows us to
control for the overall size of the annual report narrative sections. Robbins and Austin (1986), Li
et al. (2008), Kothari et al. (2009) and Bozzolan et al. (2009) also use scaling to obtain their dis-
closure scores and capture the relative focus of the disclosure within the annual report. FDSCORE
similarly captures the forward-looking focus of the narratives, allowing us to examine managerial
incentives to open up about future performance in the annual report.
3.1.2. What do we know about FDSCORE?
Hussainey et al. (2003) developed their scoring methodology to evaluate voluntary disclosures in
the annual report narratives of UK ﬁrms. This automated scoring methodology allows for sample
coverage similar to AIMR- Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) US ratings. Hussainey et al.
(2003) compare the classiﬁcations of the QSR N6 automated search against a manual inspection
of the discussion sections of 50 randomly selected annual reports and ﬁnd that QSR N6 identiﬁes
86% of the cases correctly. The remaining 14% are misclassiﬁed with type I and II errors of 12%
and 2%, respectively. Most errors occur when QSR N6 misses forward-looking information, but
any further additions to the forward-looking keywords increases the type II error. At the ﬁrm
level, the Pearson and rank correlations between the QSR N6 score and the index constructed
by manual inspection are calculated at 0.96 and 0.95.
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To further assess the nature of FDSCORE, we randomly select a sample of 140 forward-
looking performance statements from UK annual reports across our sample period. Appendix 1
presents some of these statements. Recurring themes in these statements are facts or judgements
about expected returns from: (i) new business segments and divisions, (ii) expansion
programmes, (iii) restructuring and investment programmes, (iv) mergers and acquisitions, (v)
development programmes, (vi) investments in technology, (vii) exploring growth opportunities,
(viii) new customer contracts and (ix) increased capacity and efﬁciency.7 The statements
contain predominately qualitative information about the future with no reference to a speciﬁc
time horizon. Only 1% of the random sample statements are quantitative in nature. Our obser-
vations corroborate existing evidence on the dominance of qualitative FLPDs, identiﬁed either
through an automated scoring methodology or manual inspection (Beattie et al. 2004, Schleicher
and Walker 2010).
The frequency of FLPDs has been used in a number of studies. In terms of the relevance of
FLPDs, Hussainey et al. (2003) verify that ﬁrms providing more FLPDs in their annual reports
help the market to predict future earnings changes more accurately. They also show that it is
the frequency of forward-looking earnings statements that contribute to price-leading earnings
rather than forward-looking statements about individual income statement components (e.g. rev-
enues or costs). Schleicher et al. (2007) and Hussainey and Walker (2009) add to this initial evi-
dence, showing that the effect of FLPDs on stock price anticipation of future earnings is more
pronounced for loss-making and dividend-paying ﬁrms.
3.2. Model of forward-looking disclosures
We group factors that affect the frequency of FLPDs into four categories: persistence, proprietary
costs, information environment and situational incentives that exist at the time of the disclosure.
This framework builds on existing literature on the drivers of voluntary disclosure taking into
account the speciﬁc nature of forward-looking disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993, Healy
et al. 1999, Mercer 2005, Baber et al. 2006, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006, Butler et al. 2007).
Given that our FLPDs score, FDSCORE, captures the forward-looking focus of the annual
report narratives, we consider factors affecting manager willingness to discuss future performance
within these narratives. The detailed form of our model is:
FDSCOREit =b0 + b1FDSCOREit−1 + b2AGit + b3sSALESit + b4BMit + b5NANALit
+ b6DISPERSIONit + b7SIZEit + b8SEOit + b9DEBTISSUESit
+ b10DECLINEit + b11MISSit + b12LOSSit + b13UNDERPERFORMANCEit
+ b14EQit + YEARit + INDUSTRYt + eit (1)
Appendix 2 provides detailed deﬁnitions of all variables. Below we describe the model
components.
3.2.1. Persistence
Evidence suggests that ﬁrms’ disclosures tend to persist across years (Bushee et al. 2003, Skinner
2003, Graham et al. 2005). Once managers decide to discuss future performance in the narrative
sections of the annual report, it is unlikely that they would switch back to no disclosure. To
account for the ‘stickiness’ in forward-looking disclosure decisions, we include the lagged fre-
quency of FLPDs, FDSCOREt−1.
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3.2.2. Proprietary costs
There is considerable evidence in the literature suggesting that FLPDs are value relevant.
However, this type of disclosure might provide useful information to competitors and hence
might affect the ﬁrm’s competitive position in product markets.8 Therefore, proprietary costs
may induce managers to be less open about future performance in the annual report narratives.
Our model, similar to that of Prencipe (2004), includes the ﬁrm’s asset growth rate (AG) as a
proxy for proprietary costs. Competitive costs arising from FLPDs would be particularly high
for ﬁrms with highly growing assets. Regardless of whether ﬁrms achieve high growth by exploit-
ing an existing growing market or entering new proﬁtable markets, FLPDs may reveal the exist-
ence of business opportunities to competitors. Therefore, we expect FDSCORE to be negatively
associated with the asset growth rate.
3.2.3. Information environment
Management’s disclosure choices are inherently related to the ﬁrm’s information environment.
Early theoretical work by Verrecchia (1983) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) shows that
voluntary disclosure mitigates information asymmetry and improves the ﬁrm’s information
environment. Empirical studies verify this theoretical proposition with evidence of a positive
association between poor information environments and the frequency of voluntary disclosures
(Imhoff 1978, Waymire 1985, Lang and Lundholm 1993, Tasker 1998). We ﬁrst consider the
volatility and uncertainty of the ﬁrm’s operations. Accordingly, our model includes sales variabil-
ity (sSALES), and the book to market ratio (BM). Firms with volatile operations have income
streams that are less predictable. Such ﬁrms would issue more FLPDs to reduce uncertainty
over their future proﬁtability and mitigate information asymmetry. Firms with lower book to
market ratios would also issue more FLPDs to reduce information asymmetry.9 Therefore, we
expect a positive (negative) association between FDSCORE and sSALES (BM).
We also consider factors shaping the external information environment. Managers would be
more forthcoming about future performance in their published reports when the information
demands of the investment community are rising (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006). Beattie and
Smith (2012) ﬁnd that capital market considerations dominate soft disclosures of UK ﬁnance
directors. We consider two properties of the information demand of the investment community.
The ﬁrst is the size of the demand, which we capture using the number of analysts following
the company. The second is the market uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s future potential, which we
capture through the dispersion in the analyst earnings forecasts. Higher forecast dispersion
would induce managers to provide more FLPDs to resolve market uncertainty by guiding the fore-
cast consensus. Accordingly, our model includes the number of analysts following the ﬁrm
(NANAL) and the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts during the year (DISPERSION). Con-
sistent with prior research (Lang and Lundholm 1993), we expect FDSCORE to be positively
associated with NANAL and DISPERSION.
Among the factors affecting the company’s information environment, we ﬁnally consider ﬁrm
size. The relation between ﬁrm size and disclosure is generally expected to be positive due to the
lower preparation costs for large relative to small ﬁrms (Lang and Lundholm 1993). Our
FDSCORE controls for this effect structurally, as it ﬁlters out any variation in FLPDs related to
larger ﬁrms’ ability to produce lengthier reports. We need, therefore, to consider the effect of
ﬁrm size on managers’ willingness to disclose FLPDs in the annual report. Prencipe (2004)
argues that larger ﬁrms face lower proprietary costs due to their ability to defend themselves
against competitors’ adverse action. Thus from a proprietary cost perspective, larger ﬁrms may
issue more FLPDs. Skinner (1994) also argues that larger ﬁrms would disclose more as they bear
higher damages in case of securities litigation. The latter argument, however, may not hold for
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FLPDs, due to their price sensitive nature. Litigation considerations may indeed limit the forward-
looking focus of annual report narratives (Weetman and Collins 1996). As a result, from a litigation
cost perspective, larger ﬁrms may issue fewer FLPDs. Larger ﬁrms may also not choose the annual
report narratives as the key means of releasing forward-looking information, preferring superior
communication channels (e.g. investor relation departments, conference calls, social media) to
update the market in a more timely manner. As arguments may be made for a positive or negative
association between FDSCORE and ﬁrm size, the sign of the association is an empirical question.
3.2.4. Situational incentives
These are incentives for managers at the time of the disclosure to open up about future perform-
ance triggered by speciﬁc events or circumstances, e.g. the ﬁrm’s activity in the capital markets
(debt or equity offerings) or earnings news conveyed in the ﬁnancial statements.
We ﬁrst consider incentives arising from corporate ﬁnancing transactions. Information asym-
metry considerations are higher when ﬁrms raise capital (Healy and Palepu 2001), suggesting a
higher need especially for forward-looking disclosure during equity offerings. Consistent with
this notion, empirical studies show that ﬁrms offering securities are more likely to issue earnings
forecasts (Choi 1973, Ruland et al. 1990, Healy et al. 1999) and have higher analyst ratings of dis-
closure (Lang and Lundholm 1993). This evidence suggests that ﬁrms might issue more FLPDs
when issuing equity. However, in periods of equity offerings companies might prefer to commu-
nicate forward-looking information directly tomajor investors (Healy and Palepu 1993, 1995) or to
do so through more timely channels of communication (e.g. initial public offerings (IPO) or SEO
prospectus earnings releases or conference calls). During these periods, potential legal liability and
reputation concernsmight also deter FLPDs due to their high price sensitive nature. Consistent with
this notion, Li (2009) ﬁnds that the threat of shareholder litigation gives managers incentives to
only partially disclose private prospective information during IPO. To control for the effect of
equity offerings on FLPDs, our model includes an indicator variable of share capital increases
of more than 5% during the year (SEO). As arguments may be made for a positive or negative
association between FDSCORE and SEO, the sign of the association is an empirical question.
Turning to external ﬁnancing, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that highly levered ﬁrms
have high monitoring/agency costs. These ﬁrms can reduce these costs by providing forward-
looking disclosure in their annual report narratives to convey value relevant information that
satisfy creditor needs. Consistent with this prediction, Sengupta (1998) ﬁnds that greater disclos-
ure reduces the cost of issuing debt. In this vein, managers may provide more FLPDs when
issuing debt in order to reduce ﬁnancing costs and the required risk premiums. This implies a
positive association between FDSCORE and issuing debt. We measure debt issues using an indi-
cator variable of increases in the book value of debt of more than 5% during the year (DEBTIS-
SUES). We expect a positive association between FDSCORE and DEBTISSUES.
Second, we consider incentives arising from earnings news reported in ﬁnancial statements.
Bagnoli and Watts (2007) examine voluntary disclosure as a response to managers having private
information that the market can use to better estimate the value implications of the content of the
ﬁnancial report. In their model, the content of the ﬁnancial reports affects both the possibility and
frequency of voluntary disclosure. They show that if the ﬁnancial report contains sufﬁciently bad
news, the manager discloses more private information to mitigate investors’ downward response
to a negative earnings surprise. The incentive could be particularly strong for FLPDs, as managers
may use FLPDs to communicate the speciﬁcs of the turnaround in proﬁtability. Consistent with
this notion, Schleicher et al. (2007) ﬁnd that loss ﬁrms provide more informative FLPDs in their
annual report narratives. We use four measures of ‘earnings news’ in the ﬁnancial statements.
Prior literature establishes three important earnings benchmarks for managers: earnings for the
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prior period, analyst forecasts and proﬁts (Degeorge et al. 1999, Brown 2001, Brown and Caylor
2005, Graham et al. 2005). To capture bad earnings, news in the ﬁnancial statements, we include
an indicator of earnings declines (DECLINE), falling short of the analyst forecasts (MISS) and
losses (LOSS). If the ﬁrm’s reported performance falls below expectations, managers are likely
to issue FLPDs to mitigate the market response. We, therefore, expect a positive association
between FDSCORE and these three indicators of bad news. Bagnoli and Watts (2007) also
suggest that the extent of a ﬁrm’s underperformance may also affect the probability of voluntary
disclosure, because the beneﬁts from mitigating bad news are greater the further the ﬁrm’s per-
formance deviates from market expectations. Accordingly, we include a measure of underperfor-
mance, i.e. the extent to which industry average proﬁtability exceeds ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁtability
(UNDERPERFORMANCE), and expect a positive association with FDSCORE.
If investors rely more on FLPDs of ﬁrms with high earnings quality, it is possible that earnings
quality also directly affects the frequency of FLPDs, i.e. ﬁrms with higher earnings quality dis-
close more FLPDs. This is in line with the empirical evidence of Lennox and Park (2006) who
ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher earnings informativeness issue more frequent earnings forecasts,
and Francis et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher earnings quality have higher disclosure
scores. Our model, therefore, also includes earnings quality (EQ).
3.3. Investor reliance on forward-looking disclosures
Prior research investigating the relevance of forward-looking disclosures focuses on the extent to
which these disclosures help investors ‘bring the future forward’, i.e. assist the stock market to
anticipate earnings (Hussainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et al. 2007, Hussainey and Walker 2009,
Muslu et al. 2012). To investigate how investor use of FLPDs varies with earnings quality,
especially in the presence of situational incentives, we start by examining the extent to which
FLPDs affect stock price informativeness about current and future earnings. We adopt the
model of Collins et al. (1994) adding future earnings growth to return-earnings models as follows:
Ri,t = b0 + b1Xi,t + b2Xi,t3 + b3Ri,t3 + b4EPi,t−1 + b5AGi,t + et, (2)
where Xt is the growth in EPS for year t and Xt3 is the sum of earnings growth for years t + 1 to
t + 3, Rt3 is the aggregate stock return in year t + 1 to t + 3, EPt21 is earnings in period t 2 1
over price at the start of period t, and AGt is the growth rate of total book value of assets in period
t. Equation (2) models contemporaneous returns on current and future earnings shocks.10 The spe-
ciﬁcation includes contemporaneous and future returns, lagged earnings-to-price ratio and asset
growth to account for the measurement error arising from using ex post earnings growth to
proxy for shocks in future earnings expectations.11 Similar to Tucker and Zarowin (2006), we
refer to the coefﬁcients on contemporaneous earnings growth as the earnings response coefﬁcient
(ERC) and that on future earnings growth as the future ERC (FERC). Both are predicted to be
positive. As we wish to assess the impact of FLPDs on investor assessments of earnings, we
augment the model allowing the ERC and FERC to vary with FDSCORE as follows:
Ri,t =b0 + b1Xi,t + b2Xi,t3 + b3Ri,t3 + b4EPi,t−1 + b5AGi,t + b6FDSCOREi,t
+ b7FDSCOREi,t × Xi,t + b8FDSCOREi,t × Xi,t3 + ui,t.
(3)
In this speciﬁcation b1 and b2 capture the ERC and FERC irrespective of the frequency of FLPDs.
If investors use FLPDs to reassess information in reported earnings, we expect FLPDs to increase
the ERC. If investors rely on FLPDs to improve anticipation of future earnings, we expect FLPDs
to increase FERC. To investigate investor use of FLPDs in the presence of situational incentives,
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we repeat Equation (3) for a subset of ﬁrms-year observations where managers have incentives to
be more open about future performance in the annual reports.
To investigate how investor reliance on FLPDs varies with earnings quality, we repeat
Equation (3) distinguishing between ﬁrms with high and low earnings quality. We measure earn-
ings quality using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, as modiﬁed by McNichols (2002) and
as extended to control for operating performance (Kothari et al. 2005) and the role of accruals in
asymmetric timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). The model captures the extent to
which working capital accruals map into cash ﬂows – in the current, prior and future periods,
operating performance and bad news. We estimate the model cross-sectionally by industry-
year. EQ is the standard deviation of the model residuals calculated at the ﬁrm level using a
rolling window of ﬁve years.12 As such, EQ captures ﬁrm-speciﬁc inter-temporal variation of
accrual estimation errors over a ﬁve-year window, proxying well for the reporting reputation
that managers have established over the years. In additional analyses, we test the sensitivity of
our results to alternative earnings quality measures. EQ provides an inverse measure of earnings
quality, i.e. larger EQ implies lower earnings quality. Therefore, we classify ﬁrms with high (low)
earnings quality if EQ is below (above) the industry and year median. If investor reliance on
FLPDs increases with reported earnings quality, we expect FLPDs to increase ERC and FERC
only for ﬁrms with high earnings quality.
4. Sample
Our sample of companies comprises the FTSEAll Share non-ﬁnancial UK ﬁrms. Similar to Beretta
and Bozzolan (2008), we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms because of their regulation of disclosure of
forward-looking information. A requirement for using QSR N6 is the availability of annual
reports in electronic form and in text format. We collect electronic versions of the UK annual
reports for the years 1996–2007. We start collecting annual reports from 1996 because from
this date large cross-sections of electronic UK annual reports are available on the Dialog database.
Dialog stores reports in standard text format, deleting images and graphs and retaining all text and
numbers. The database was discontinued by Thomson Financial in mid-2004 after comprehensive
coverage for year 2002. To collect electronic versions of annual reports for the period 2003–2007,
we use the Northcote Database (http://www.northcote.co.uk). Northcote offers annual reports in a
portable document format. We convert these reports to standard text format, deleting images and
graphs and retaining all text and numbers. We end our analysis in the year 2007 because the UK
2006 Companies Act speciﬁed the contents of the business review, thereby structuring the content
of a substantial part of the annual report narratives for periods beginning on or after October
2007.13 The total number of annual reports of all UK listed non-ﬁnancial companies collected
over the period 1996–2007 is 10,095. Retaining observations with available accounting and
analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S to estimate our model of forward-looking dis-
closures reduces the sample to 5,459 observations for 1,273 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms – 4,824
observations when we include lagged FDSCORE. For price-leading earnings tests, the require-
ment of three years ahead earnings and returns data reduces the number of usable observations
to 4,321. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorise the top and bottom 0.5% of all variables.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the statistics for the variables. The mean FDSCORE is 2.818, which
indicates that about 3 of every 100 sentences in the annual report are FLPDs. This translates into
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approximately seven FLPDs on average per annual report, based upon a mean count of 235 sen-
tences in annual report narratives. The maximum number of FLPDs in the narratives is 31 (13 per
100 sentences), while the minimum is zero. Our sample comprises mainly larger ﬁrms followed
on average by seven analysts. This sample attribute is similar to prior studies investigating the
value relevance of FLPDs (Hussainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et al. 2007, Hussainey and
Walker 2009). In our sample, the frequency of equity offerings is 17%, while that of debt
issues is 45%. Consistent with prior research (Athanasakou et al. 2011), ﬁrms missing earnings
targets are a minority ranging from 38% of ﬁrms reporting earnings declines to 40% missing
analyst forecasts and only 12% reporting losses during the sample period. Our sample ﬁrms on
average over-perform their industry peers as mean UNDERPERFORMANCE is negative
(20.080). The mean annual returns for year t (Rt) are 0.092. The median annual returns are
0.090 and their standard deviation is 0.473. Mean change in EPS for year t scaled by lagged
price (Xt) is 0.010 with a standard deviation of 0.188, while the average aggregate change in
EPS three years ahead scaled by lagged price is 0.002 with a standard deviation of 0.296.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of FLPDs across situational incentives. Managers of
ﬁrms that issue equity (SEO ¼ 1) issue fewer FLPDs on average in their annual reports. Firms
issuing debt (DEBTISSUES ¼ 1), however, issue more FLPDs. The same holds for ﬁrms con-
veying bad news about their performance in the income statement, i.e. earnings that fall short
of last year earnings (DECLINE ¼ 1), of the analyst forecast outstanding at the earnings
announcement date (MISS ¼ 1) and of the average industry performance (UNDERPERORM
¼ 1). The differences in the frequency of FLPDs for these ﬁrms compared with the remaining
ﬁrms in the sample are statistically signiﬁcant. Panel C reports the frequency of FLPDs for
ﬁrms facing multiple situational incentives. Firms facing all four situational incentives (DEBTIS-
SUES ¼ 1, DECLINE ¼ 1, MISS ¼ 1 and UNDERPERFORM ¼ 1) seem to be the most
forward-looking, issuing on average nine FLPDs (3.563 per 100 sentences × 235 sentences
per report) in their annual report, compared with six FLPDs (2.529 per 100 sentences × 235 sen-
tences per report) issued by ﬁrms not facing any of these incentives.
Panel D of Table 1 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations (above and below the diag-
onal) between key variables. As expected, there is a signiﬁcant positive association between ﬁrm
size and analyst following, highlighting the need to assess the impact of these two effects on
FLPDs in a multivariate setting. Among situational incentives, there is a positive association
between corporate ﬁnancing events, i.e. equity offerings and debt issues, and a strong positive
association between the bad news indicators. The latter associations suggest that managers
may face multiple situational incentives at the time of disclosure. We take this into account
when examining the relevance of FLPDs in the presence of situational incentives.
5.2. What drives FLPDs?
Table 2 reports regression results for the factors inﬂuencing the frequency of FLPDs (Equation
(1)). The ﬁrst column reports the results of Equation (1) excluding FDSCOREt21, therefore high-
lighting the cross-sectional effects. FDSCORE is negatively associated with AG, SIZE and SEO
and positively associated with sSALES, BM, DEBTISSUES, DECLINE, MISS and UNDER-
PERFORMANCE. With regards to size, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) ﬁnd a positive associ-
ation with FLPDs, using total assets as a proxy for size. Their ﬁnding is consistent with their
hypothesis that larger ﬁrms have enough resources to provide lengthy narrative sections in
their annual reports. We control for this effect when constructing our FLPDs index as we scale
FLPDs with the total number of sentences in the narrative sections.14 Therefore, the negative
association between FDSCORE and SIZE in our speciﬁcation suggests that larger ﬁrms have a
lower forward-looking focus in their annual report narratives.15 This may be due to larger
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variables N Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
FDSCORE 5459 2.818 2.326 2.180 0.000 12.903
AG 5459 0.189 0.069 0.581 20.604 5.502
sSALES 5459 0.257 0.147 0.340 0.002 2.651
BM 5459 0.624 0.475 0.583 20.424 3.792
NANAL 5459 7.147 5.000 6.490 1.000 47.000
DISPERSION 5459 0.373 0.094 1.119 0.000 11.773
SIZE 5459 11.912 11.773 1.829 7.840 17.156
SEO 5459 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.000 1.000
DEBTISSUES 5459 0.452 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
DECLINE 5459 0.378 0.000 0.485 0.000 1.000
MISS 5459 0.396 0.000 0.489 0.000 1.000
LOSS 5459 0.117 0.000 0.321 0.000 1.000
UNDERPERFORMANCE 5459 20.080 20.036 0.438 24.051 1.363
EQ 5459 0.063 0.044 0.067 0.000 0.478
Rt 4321 0.092 0.090 0.473 21.497 2.125
Xt 4321 0.010 0.006 0.188 20.917 1.434
Xt3 4321 0.002 0.001 0.296 22.074 1.732
Rt3 4321 0.148 0.155 0.694 22.224 2.696
EPt21 4321 0.032 0.061 0.168 21.424 0.408
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Panel B: Forward-looking disclosures (FDSCORE) across situational incentives
Variables N Mean Median Diff. (mean) t-Stat (p-value)
Equity offerings
SEO ¼ 1 927 2.560 2.095 (0.311) 24.49 (,0.001)
SEO ¼ 0 4532 2.871 2.376
Debt issues
DEBTISSUES ¼ 1 2465 2.881 2.381 0.115 2.76 (0.006)
DEBTISSUES ¼ 0 2994 2.766 2.290
Earnings declines
DECLINE ¼ 1 2066 3.065 2.500 0.398 6.60 (,0.001)
DECLINE ¼ 0 3393 2.667 2.200
Missing analyst forecasts
MISS ¼ 1 2163 2.904 2.392 0.143 2.20 (0.028)
MISS ¼ 0 3296 2.761 2.273
Losses
LOSS ¼ 1 638 2.749 2.094 (0.078) 23.30 (0.001)
LOSS ¼ 0 4821 2.827 2.362
Underperformance
UNDERPERFORM ¼ 1 1787 3.040 2.478 0.330 5.14 (,0.001)
UNDERPERFORM ¼ 0 3672 2.710 2.246
N 5459
Panel C: Forward-looking disclosures (FDSCORE) when there are no situational incentives and in the presence of multiple of the following situational incentives:
debt issues, earnings declines, missing analyst forecasts and underperformance compared with industry peers – DEBTISSUES ¼ 1, Decline ¼ 1, MISS ¼ 1,
UNDERPERFORM ¼ 1
Situational incentives N Mean Median Diff. (mean) t-Stat (p-value)
0 995 2.529 2.091
1 1784 2.763 2.271 0.234 2.65 (0.008)
2 1565 2.801 2.302 0.038 0.61 (0.544)
3 893 3.094 2.548 0.293 3.34 (,0.001)
4 222 3.563 3.075 0.469 3.09 (0.002)
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued.
Variables FDSCORE AG sSALES BM NANAL DISPERSION SIZE EQ SEO
DEBT
ISSUES DECLINE MISS LOSS
UNDER-
PERFORMANCE
Panel D: Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations between key variables
FDSCORE 1.000 20.044 0.053 0.185 20.177 0.022 20.274 0.004 20.055 0.027 0.089 0.033 20.012 0.073
AG 20.063 1.000 0.190 20.135 20.049 20.016 20.019 0.157 0.438 0.218 20.067 0.019 0.042 20.048
sSALES 0.104 0.062 1.000 20.111 20.151 0.040 20.139 0.247 0.161 0.007 0.048 0.078 0.079 0.012
BM 0.191 20.237 20.173 1.000 20.178 0.093 20.297 20.116 20.121 20.061 0.173 0.061 0.083 0.099
NANAL 20.158 0.001 20.200 20.176 1.000 20.071 0.820 20.165 20.079 0.086 20.023 20.040 20.169 20.038
DISPERSION 0.041 20.259 0.140 0.160 20.085 1.000 20.062 0.066 0.021 20.031 0.192 0.091 0.186 0.027
SIZE 20.249 0.029 20.208 20.275 0.832 20.100 1.000 20.160 20.063 0.099 20.019 20.029 20.172 20.064
EQ 0.001 0.047 0.288 20.130 20.185 0.116 20.182 1.000 0.123 20.013 0.016 0.047 0.120 20.043
SEO 20.063 0.390 0.159 20.147 20.079 0.057 20.067 0.130 1.000 0.125 0.009 0.055 0.154 0.010
DEBTISSUES 0.038 0.434 20.001 20.054 0.095 20.069 0.105 20.026 0.125 1.000 20.009 0.003 20.071 20.034
DECLINE 0.089 20.224 0.074 0.167 20.033 0.480 20.026 0.021 0.009 20.009 1.000 0.278 0.253 0.058
MISS 0.030 20.074 0.073 0.040 20.057 0.195 20.036 0.051 0.055 0.003 0.278 1.000 0.239 0.022
LOSS 20.045 20.186 0.086 0.009 20.209 0.320 20.178 0.125 0.154 20.071 0.253 0.239 1.000 0.143
UNDER-PERFORMANCE 0.114 20.182 20.027 0.297 20.045 0.174 20.111 20.115 0.047 0.031 0.142 0.077 0.233 1.000
Rt Xt Xt3 Rt3 AG EPt21 FDSCORE
Rt 1.000 0.183 20.045 20.073 0.157 20.073 20.107
Xt 0.308 1.000 20.227 20.007 20.007 20.542 20.057
Xt3 20.003 20.153 1.000 0.186 20.076 20.139 20.005
Rt3 0.002 0.038 0.350 1.000 20.133 0.019 0.024
AG 0.189 0.136 20.167 20.069 1.000 0.043 20.055
EPt21 0.008 20.257 20.041 0.069 0.053 1.000 0.050
FDSCORE 20.111 20.063 0.002 0.013 20.059 0.145 1.000
Notes: The sample consists of 5459 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1273 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from
Datastream and I/B/E/S 1,138 observations are eliminated when further requiring stock price data. Appendix 2 deﬁnes the variables. p-Value corresponds to a Wilcoxon non-parametric
test (two-sided) for the difference in means between the sub-samples. In Panel D all reported correlations highlighted in grey are not signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
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ﬁrms’ litigation considerations or alternative means of dissemination (Section 3.2). Litigation
concerns are also suggested by the evidence of a negative association between FDSCORE and
SEO, which means that ﬁrms issue fewer FLPDs in years of issuing equity. The UK Financial
Services Authority advises listed companies to be wary of making unintentional proﬁt projections
ahead of equity offerings, which could discourage managers from being overly forthcoming about
future performance in these periods.16 In contrast, when it comes to issuing debt, UK ﬁrms seem
to be making extensive use of FLPDs in their annual reports. This evidence suggests a constraint
to forward-looking disclosure in the annual report in periods of equity offerings, which could be
ideally suited to counter managerial optimism evident in these periods (Lang and Lundholm
2000). In summary, the results of the ﬁrst column suggest that across the section of UK ﬁrms,
FLPDs decrease with proprietary considerations (captured by asset growth rates) and equity offer-
ings, and increase with the revenue volatility, book to market ratio, debt issues, and reporting of
bad news in ﬁnancial statements and the extent of underperformance. These factors explain
approximately 18% of the variation in the frequency of FLPDs.
In the next column, we include FDSCOREt21 and as expected FLPDs persist over time. The
explanatory power of the speciﬁcation rises substantially to 26%. As we control for the persist-
ence of FDSCORE, these results highlight the factors driving changes in the forward-looking
focus of the annual report narratives across time. In this speciﬁcation, NANAL is positive and
signiﬁcant, consistent with analyst following triggering additional disclosures of FLPDs.17 BM
is positively associated to FDSCORE. This might be due to the endogenous nature of BM as
more FLPDs reduce information asymmetry. To investigate this issue further, we repeat the analy-
sis adding BMt21 in our model. The next column reports the regression results. BMt21 is nega-
tively associated with FDSORE while BM retains the positive association.18 These results suggest
a feedback loop between FLPDs and the book-to-market divergence, higher divergence induces
managers to open up about future performance in the narrative sections of their annual reports,
and this openness subsequently reduces information asymmetry, consistent with our claim.19
Taken together, the results of Table 2 show that FLPDs are part of a ‘sticky’ disclosure policy.
Controlling for the persistence of FLPDs across years, we ﬁnd that proprietary costs and equity
offerings in the current period restrain the forward-looking focus of the annual reports. Managers
provide more FLPDs to reduce the book-to-market divergence and respond to higher information
demands of the investment community, i.e. high analyst following. In terms of situational incen-
tives, FLPDs increase when ﬁrms issue debt or convey bad news in their ﬁnancial statements, in
the form of earnings declines and falling short of analyst forecasts and average industry
performance.
5.3. The perceived credibility of forward-looking disclosure
Table 3 presents results on the extent to which FLPDs affect stock price informativeness about
current and future earnings (Equation (3)). The coefﬁcient on Xt is positive and highly signiﬁcant
(0.543, t = 4.41), yielding a strong ERC. The coefﬁcient on Xt3 is, however, insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that prices do not lead earnings for three periods. Consistent with evidence from Hus-
sainey et al. (2003), additional untabulated analysis on disaggregated future earnings changes
shows that this is due to prices leading earnings one year ahead, but to a much lesser extent
for two and three periods ahead. The insigniﬁcance of the effect of Xt3 may be also due to
share price anticipation of future earnings varying with the frequency of FLPDs. The next
column presents the results of Equation (3). The coefﬁcient on FDSCORE× Xt3 is positive
and marginally signiﬁcant (0.024, t = 1.65), consistent with FLPDs increasing the FERC, i.e.
the share price anticipation of future earnings. To shed further light on the interpretation of this
result, we test a speciﬁcation without interaction terms distinguishing between ﬁrms with high
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and low FDSCORE (splitting using the sample median). The coefﬁcient on Xt3 (not tabulated) is
positive and signiﬁcant (0.155, t = 2.00) only when FDSCORE is above the sample median.
When FDSCORE is below the sample median, Xt3 is insigniﬁcant. Thus, it is only higher frequen-
cies of FLPDs in annual report narratives that enable stock prices to capture more information
about future earnings. The results for the measurement error proxies EPt21, Rt3 and AGt are gen-
erally in line with those reported by Hussainey et al. (2003).20
Table 2. The determinants of FLPD (FDSCORE).
Variables Pred. sign Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
FDSCOREt21 + 0.285∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(8.97) (9.01)
AG 2 20.095∗∗∗ 20.113∗∗∗ 20.135∗∗∗
(24.38) (23.67) (23.86)
sSALES + 0.160∗ 0.138 0.114
(1.74) (1.45) (1.26)
BMt21 2 20.289
∗∗∗
(23.48)
BM 2 0.162∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(2.13) (1.98) (3.54)
NANAL + 0.016 0.018∗ 0.022∗∗
(1.25) (1.74) (2.16)
DISPERSION + 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.40) (0.40) (0.34)
SIZE +/2 20.321∗∗∗ 20.222∗∗∗ 20.252∗∗∗
(28.42) (26.71) (27.11)
SEO +/2 20.137∗∗ 20.133∗ 20.133∗
(22.55) (21.86) (21.90)
DEBTISSUES + 0.238∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(2.97) (3.40) (3.34)
DECLINE + 0.089∗∗ 0.058 0.062∗
(2.08) (1.53) (1.66)
MISS + 0.367∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(5.15) (4.70) (4.72)
LOSS + 20.070 0.022 0.018
(20.54) (0.21) (0.17)
UNDERPERFORMANCE + 0.093∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(2.95) (3.66) (4.62)
EQ 2 20.122 20.475 20.528
(20.24) (21.21) (21.36)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Observations 5459 4824 4824
Adj. R2 0.1842 0.2622 0.2640
Notes: The sample consists of 5459 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1273 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with
available accounting and analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. Six hundred and thirty-ﬁve (635) observations
are eliminated when including lagged frequency of forward-looking performance statements. Appendix 2 deﬁnes the
variables. We report the coefﬁcient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the frequency of FLPD
(FDSCORE) on a dynamic factor and variables proxying for the ﬁrm’s information environment and situational
incentives. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and ﬁrm to control for
cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.
∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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Table 3. Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE), situational incentives and share price anticipation of earnings.
Entire sample
Variables
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
DEBTISSUES ¼
1
Coeff. (t-stat)
DECLINE ¼
1
Coeff. (t-stat)
MISS ¼ 1
Coeff.
(t-stat)
UNDER-PERFORM
¼ 1
Coeff. (t-stat)
Multiple situational
incentives
Coeff. (t-stat)
Xt 0.543
∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗ 0.072 0.068 0.233 20.001
(4.41) (4.86) (2.87) (2.03) (0.28) (0.38) (1.26) (20.00)
Xt3 0.055 0.028 20.046 20.019 20.041 20.121 0.021 20.089
(1.07) (0.73) (21.03) (20.15) (20.37) (21.24) (0.24) (20.61)
Rt3 20.039 20.045 20.044 20.060 20.069 20.047 20.081
∗ 20.108∗∗
(20.82) (21.09) (21.09) (21.35) (21.63) (21.25) (21.82) (22.21)
AGt 0.118
∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(3.27) (3.78) (3.77) (4.20) (2.88) (6.03) (4.09) (3.71)
EPt21 0.126 0.129 0.119 0.449
∗∗ 0.089 20.070 20.006 20.039
(0.86) (1.16) (1.03) (2.24) (0.65) (20.61) (20.04) (20.23)
FDSCOREt 20.013
∗∗∗ 20.011∗∗ 20.020∗∗∗ 20.008 20.015∗∗ 20.020∗∗∗
(23.70) (22.15) (24.36) (21.63) (22.14) (24.27)
FDSCOREt × Xt 0.027 0.065 0.040 0.085∗∗∗ 0.037 0.047
(1.62) (1.02) (1.22) (4.96) (1.36) (1.25)
FDSCOREt × Xt3 0.024∗ 0.029 0.030∗ 0.028 0.021 0.031
(1.65) (1.16) (1.89) (1.20) (1.59) (1.28)
Year dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4321 4321 4321 2000 1567 1671 1352 821
Adj. R2 0.0588 0.1242 0.1282 0.1615 0.1226 0.1331 0.1536 0.1816
Notes: The sample consists of 4321 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1056 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from
Datastream and I/B/E/S. Appendix 2 deﬁnes the variables. Multiple situational incentives include ﬁrm-year observations with at least two of the following situational incentives: debt
issues, earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and underperformance compared with the industry peers (DEBTISSUES, DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). We report the
coefﬁcient estimates from OLS regressions of annual stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the frequency of forward-looking performance statements
within subsets of observations with situational incentives. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and ﬁrm to control for cross-sectional
dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.
∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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Table 4. Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE), situational incentives, earnings quality and share price anticipation of earnings.
Variables
Entire sample
Debtissues
DEBTISSUES ¼ 1
Earnings declines
DECLINE ¼ 1
Missed expectations
MISS ¼ 1
Underperformance
UNDERPERFORM ¼ 1
Multiple situational
incentives
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
High
earnings
quality
Low
earnings
quality
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Xt 0.254
∗∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.280 0.559∗ 20.114 0.246 20.135 0.412 0.158 0.414 0.061 0.098
(2.16) (2.30) (1.25) (1.90) (20.44) (0.77) (20.81) (1.30) (0.61) (1.42) (0.22) (0.24)
Xt3 20.125 0.048 20.153 0.052 20.175 0.176 20.262
∗ 0.108 20.044 0.187 20.102 0.172
(21.58) (0.58) (21.09) (0.49) (20.87) (1.01) (21.85) (0.69) (20.34) (1.39) (20.60) (0.56)
Rt3 20.053 20.027 20.040 20.073 20.075 20.048 20.065
∗ 20.024 20.106∗∗ 20.035 20.079∗ 20.112∗
(21.29) (20.59) (21.04) (21.28) (21.63) (20.87) (21.78) (20.51) (21.97) (20.99) (21.90) (21.71)
AGt 0.087
∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.036 0.176∗∗∗ 0.020 0.162∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.31) (4.42) (2.50) (2.17) (3.27) (6.03) (10.43) (0.99) (5.72) (0.46) (5.51)
EPt21 20.054 0.326
∗ 0.076 0.734∗∗∗ 20.075 0.414∗∗∗ 20.185 0.297∗ 20.026 0.094 20.103 0.554∗∗
(20.52) (1.86) (0.54) (3.31) (20.41) (2.65) (21.20) (1.78) (20.16) (0.41) (20.54) (2.27)
FDSCOREt 20.015
∗∗∗ 20.005 20.005 20.016∗∗ 20.016∗∗∗ 20.019∗∗ 20.015∗∗∗ 20.004 20.016∗∗∗ 20.009 20.017∗∗ 20.013
(23.21) (21.63) (20.76) (22.23) (23.79) (22.32) (23.72) (20.39) (22.67) (20.84) (22.24) (20.92)
FDSCOREt × Xt 0.046∗∗ 0.023 0.164∗ 0.054 0.097∗ 0.014 0.120∗∗∗ 0.043 0.063 0.001 0.103∗ 0.020
(2.32) (0.90) (1.80) (0.89) (1.78) (0.31) (3.34) (1.17) (1.59) (0.03) (1.93) (0.32)
FDSCOREt × Xt3 0.032∗ 0.012 0.055∗ 0.023 0.061∗ 20.000 0.071∗∗∗ 20.010 0.027∗ 0.002 0.060∗∗∗ 20.014
(1.77) (1.19) (1.85) (1.21) (1.65) (20.02) (3.24) (20.85) (1.67) (0.09) (2.64) (20.29)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2171 2150 1043 957 812 755 855 816 667 685 411 410
Adj. R2 0.1611 0.1742 0.1445 0.1941 0.1336 0.1479 0.1492 0.1511 0.1844 0.1827 0.2427 0.2167
Notes: The sample consists of 4321 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1056 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from
Datastream and I/B/E/S. High (low) earnings quality includes ﬁrm-year observations where EQ (inverse measure of earnings quality) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median.
Multiple situational incentives includes ﬁrm-year observations with at least two of the following situational incentives: debt issues, earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and
underperformance compared with the industry peers (DEBTISSUES, DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). We report the coefﬁcient estimates from OLS regressions of annual
stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the frequency of forward-looking performance statements within subsets of observations with situational incentives.
t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and ﬁrm to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.
∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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The remaining columns of Table 3 show how investors’ use of FLPDs varies for ﬁrms that
issue debt or convey bad news in their ﬁnancial statements in the form of earnings declines,
missing analyst forecasts or underperforming relative to industry peers. FLPDs appear to margin-
ally affect share price anticipation of future earnings when ﬁrms report declines in proﬁtability
(DECLINE ¼ 1). In the presence of all other situational incentives, FDSCORE× Xt3 is insignif-
icant (t-statistics range from 1.16 to 1.59). The results suggest an element of scepticism towards
FLPDs when disclosed by managers facing situational incentives at the time of the disclosure.
Investor scepticism seems to evolve also around contemporaneously reported earnings as Xt is
also insigniﬁcant for ﬁrms facing situational incentives. We next investigate whether in these
cases investors base their reliance on earnings quality.
Table 4 reports the regression results of Equation (3) distinguishing between ﬁrms with high
and low earnings quality. Given that EQ is an inverse measure of earnings quality, we classify
ﬁrms with high (low) earnings quality if EQ is below (above) the industry and year median.
The ﬁrst two columns show the unconditional effect of earnings quality on the relevance of
FLPDs on the entire sample. FDSCORE× Xt and FDSCORE× Xt3 are positive and signiﬁcant
only for ﬁrms with higher earnings quality (t-statistics 2.32 and 1.77). In the presence of situa-
tional incentives, and particularly when ﬁrms issue debt (DEBTISSUES ¼ 1), report earnings
declines (DECLINE ¼ 1), or earnings that fall short of the analyst forecasts (MISS ¼ 1) or of
industry performance (UNDERPERFORM ¼ 1) FDSCORE× Xt3 is positive and signiﬁcant
only for ﬁrms with higher earnings quality (t-statistics range from 1.65 to 3.24). In most of
these cases, and particularly within ﬁrms that miss analyst forecasts, FDSCORE× Xt is also posi-
tive and signiﬁcant (t-statistics range from 1.80 to 3.34), consistent with FLPDs increasing the
informativeness of current year earnings for these ﬁrms. These results suggest that investors
use FLPDs to reassess information in contemporaneous earnings and anticipate future earnings
only when reported earnings quality is high. In the last column, we repeat the analysis for
ﬁrms facing at least two situational incentives and obtain stronger results. This suggests that
investors are particularly cautious when ﬁrms face multiple situational incentives. At the same
time, it suggests a beneﬁt in terms of higher credibility for their narrative disclosures when man-
agers have an established reputation for high quality earnings in their ﬁnancial statements.
5.4. Additional analyses
5.4.1. Earnings quality as a gauge of management credibility
We run the analysis of Table 4 through various sensitivity tests. For brevity, we report in Table 5
the results for ﬁrms facing at least two situational incentives, but we obtain similar inferences for
ﬁrms facing individual situational incentives. In our ﬁrst test, we repeat the analysis using earn-
ings variability as an alternative earnings quality measure. Earnings variability has been shown to
work as an instrument for various earnings quality measures, such as earnings smoothness, earn-
ings predictability and poor matching of revenue and expenses (Francis et al. 2004, Dichev and
Tang 2009), that are closely related to management credibility. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5
report the regression results. FDSCORE× Xt and FDSCORE× Xt3 are positive and signiﬁcant
only for ﬁrms with low earnings volatility (t-statistics 2.39 and 1.89).
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005) show that the Dechow and Dichev
(2002) earnings quality measure that we use for our main test is a function of both business funda-
mentals and managerial intent. To the extent that earnings quality is driven by the company’s
business model, earnings quality is unlikely to serve as a gauge for management credibility
and may not affect investor reliance on FLPDs. To address this issue, we regress our earnings
quality measure on the seven variables proxying for business fundamentals as identiﬁed by
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005), i.e. size, cash ﬂow volatility, sales
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Table 5. Earnings quality as a gauge of management credibility?.
Variables
Low earnings
volatility
Coeff. (t-stat)
High
earnings
volatility
Coeff. (t-
stat)
High discretionary
earnings quality
Coeff. (t-stat)
Low discretionary
earnings quality
Coeff. (t-stat)
Multiple situational incentives
Low earnings
quality
Coeff.
(t-stat)
Low analyst
dispersion
Coeff. (t-
stat)
High analyst
dispersion
Coeff. (t-
stat)
Low analyst
coverage
Coeff. (t-stat)
High analyst
coverage
Coeff. (t-stat)
High earnings
quality
Coeff. (t-stat)
Xt 20.103 0.285 0.036 20.325 0.009 0.360 0.033 0.028 0.688 20.194
(20.29) (0.56) (0.17) (20.60) (0.04) (0.81) (0.12) (0.07) (1.38) (20.73)
Xt3 20.201 0.168 20.046 20.209 20.042 0.247 20.108 0.198 0.037 20.112
(21.09) (0.75) (20.37) (21.06) (20.28) (0.89) (20.67) (0.69) (0.24) (20.75)
Rt3 20.137
∗ 20.051 20.148∗∗∗ 20.075 20.086∗∗ 20.173∗∗ 20.079∗ 20.116 20.021 20.104∗
(21.78) (21.62) (25.69) (20.96) (22.15) (22.24) (21.89) (21.62) (20.36) (21.94)
AGt 0.116
∗∗ 0.006 0.162∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.018 0.166∗∗∗ 0.148 0.097∗
(2.35) (0.16) (5.04) (2.23) (4.18) (1.85) (0.40) (5.40) (1.48) (1.74)
EPt21 20.164 20.049 20.090 0.033 20.012 0.790 20.109 0.534
∗∗ 20.085 20.043
(20.70) (20.16) (20.49) (0.07) (20.13) (1.53) (20.61) (2.20) (20.51) (20.24)
FDSCOREt 20.024
∗∗∗ 20.011 20.013 20.022∗∗ 20.015 20.024∗∗∗ 20.017∗∗ 20.017 20.021∗ 20.018∗
(22.77) (21.55) (21.09) (22.28) (21.37) (22.94) (22.31) (21.19) (21.96) (21.81)
FDSCOREt × Xt 0.074∗∗ 20.055 0.120∗∗∗ 0.070 0.052 0.023 0.108∗ 0.019 20.166 0.058
(2.39) (20.68) (2.94) (1.45) (1.14) (0.24) (1.88) (0.33) (21.21) (1.00)
FDSCOREt × Xt3 0.053∗ 20.023 0.065∗∗ 0.013 0.023 0.006 0.061∗∗∗ 20.014 20.127 0.035
(1.89) (20.54) (2.19) (1.28) (0.74) (0.06) (2.70) (20.32) (21.60) (1.25)
DISPERSIONt 20.001 20.015
∗∗
(20.65) (22.23)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 384 437 377 444 392 429 411 410 231 590
Adj. R2 0.1989 0.1486 0.2971 0.1159 0.2102 0.1519 0.2346 0.2387 0.2109 0.1765
Notes: The original sample consists of 4321 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1056 UK listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast
data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. In this table we retain only 821 observations of ﬁrms facing multiple situational incentives. Multiple situational incentives includes ﬁrm-year
observations with at least two of the following situational incentives: debt issues, earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and underperformance compared with the industry
peers (DEBTISSUES, DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). Appendix 2 deﬁnes the variables. High (low) earnings quality includes ﬁrm-year observations where EQ (inverse
measure of earnings quality) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. Low (high) earnings volatility includes ﬁrm-year observations where ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
variability (sEARN) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. Low (high) analyst coverage includes ﬁrm-year observations where the number of analysts following the
ﬁrm (NANAL) are below (above) the sample median. Low (high) analyst dispersion includes ﬁrm-year observations where the analyst forecast dispersion (DISPERSION) is below
(above) the sample median. We report the coefﬁcient estimates from OLS regressions of annual stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the frequency
of forward-looking performance statements within subsets of observations with situational incentives. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year
and ﬁrm to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.
∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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volatility, operating cash cycle, cumulative losses, intangible assets intensity and capital assets
intensity. As in Francis et al. (2005), we obtain the regression residuals as a proxy for discretion-
ary earnings quality, i.e. the part of earnings quality that is more likely to reﬂect managerial intent.
The next two columns of Table 5 report the regression results. FDSCORE× Xt and
FDSCORE× Xt3 remain positive and signiﬁcant only for ﬁrms with high discretionary earnings
quality (t-statistics 2.94 and 2.19), consistent with this part of earnings quality being the deﬁning
factor for investor reliance on FLPDs.
Among factors relating to the ﬁrm’s information environment, we focus on earnings quality as
it is directly affected by managers, i.e. the ‘messengers’ of FLPDs. As UK ﬁrms do not provide
information about their future trading through earnings forecasts releases, forecasting reputation
cannot be used to assess whether FLPDs are credible. It is, however, possible that investors evalu-
ate other aspects of the ﬁrm’s information environment in deciding whether to rely on FLPDs.
One such aspect might be the assurance provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries such as ﬁnancial
analysts. Mercer (2004) argues that ﬁnancial analysts are a source of external assurance for man-
agement disclosures. Evidence, largely anecdotal, suggests that ﬁnancial analysts do indeed affect
the weight that investors give to management disclosures. To test whether analyst coverage affects
investor reaction to management disclosures, we repeat our analysis distinguishing between ﬁrms
with low and high analyst coverage. We split the sample based on the sample median of ﬁve ana-
lysts. The next two columns of Table 5 report the regression results. FDSCORE× Xt and
FDSCORE× Xt3 are not signiﬁcant in either column, consistent with analyst coverage not affect-
ing investors reliance on FLPDs in the presence of situational incentives.
Another consideration relating to the ﬁrm’s information environment is the role of the overall
level of voluntary disclosure when considering the relevance of FLPDs. Our FDSCORE index
partly controls for the ﬁrm’s overall disclosure strategy by scaling the FLPDs with the length
of the narrative sections. However, another type of ﬁrm disclosure within the narratives may
also be used to ‘bring the future forward’, as FLPDs, and if positively correlated with FLPDs
could lead to erroneous inferences. There is a large body of literature that argues and shows
that FLPDs increase the amount of future earnings news reﬂected in current stock returns (Hus-
sainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et al. 2007, Hussainey and Walker 2009, Muslu et al. 2012). This
effect is conceptually grounded on the nature of FLPDs, i.e. their forward-looking perspective and
explicit reference to proﬁts. While annual report narratives contain other types of voluntary dis-
closure, FLPDs are those expected to be behind the price-leading earnings association for UK
ﬁrms. Hussainey et al. (2003) verify this empirically with evidence that only FLPDs, and not
other types of disclosures in the annual report, help investors anticipate future earnings. Hence
the concern relates mainly to the instances where UK ﬁrms use a channel other than annual
reports to communicate information and where that other channel is correlated with FLPDs.
Prior evidence suggests that this is unlikely to be the case as in the UK ﬁrms typically do com-
municate information about future proﬁts through annual report narratives (Brennan 1999, Schlei-
cher and Walker 2010). To mitigate this concern further, we test how our results vary with proxies
associated with the ﬁrm disclosures. As there is no single score rating UK ﬁrms’ overall voluntary
disclosure, we use a market-based measure associated with ﬁrm disclosures, analyst forecasts dis-
persion (DISPERSION). Dispersion in analyst forecasts reﬂects the overall level of uncertainty
within the investment community and has been found to be negatively associated with ﬁrm dis-
closure proxies (Healy and Palepu 2001). It, therefore, offers an inverse proxy for the overall dis-
closure level that is well suited for our purposes.21 To test whether FLPDs have an incremental
effect on the price-leading earnings association, we ﬁrst repeat our tests adding DISPERSION
as an additional control. The next two columns of Table 5 report the results. Both
FDSCORE× Xt and FDSCORE× Xt3 remain positive and signiﬁcant for the ﬁrms with high
earnings quality (t-statistics 1.88 and 2.70), consistent with analyst forecast dispersion not
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subsuming the main effect of FLPDs. As earnings quality is also positively correlated with ﬁrm
disclosures, and therefore analyst forecast dispersion, we next test whether DISPERSION can
equally explain the differential weights on FLPDs. We expect analyst forecast dispersion to be
a noisier proxy of management credibility than earnings quality, as it is affected by the efﬁciency
and incentives of information intermediaries. In the ﬁnal two columns of Table 5, we repeat the
analysis distinguishing between ﬁrms with low and high analyst forecast dispersion (DIS-
PERSION). FDSCORE× Xt and FDSCORE× Xt3 are not signiﬁcant in either column, consist-
ent with analyst forecast dispersion not affecting investors reliance on FLPDs.
In summary, Table 5 shows that our core ﬁnding is sustained when considering simpler earn-
ings properties, such as earnings volatility, and ﬁltering out the variation of earnings quality
related to business fundamentals. Other aspects of the ﬁrm’s information environment that are
arguably less informative about the credibility of management disclosures compared with
Table 6. Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE) and share price anticipation of earnings over time and
across earnings quality.
Variables Entire sample High earnings quality Low earnings quality
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Xt 0.433
∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.597∗∗
(2.97) (2.03) (2.57)
Xt3 0.007 20.029 20.007
(0.12) (20.24) (20.05)
Rt3 20.051 20.057 20.046
(21.07) (21.15) (20.86)
AG 0.103∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(8.01) (2.66) (6.75)
EPt21 0.176
∗ 0.081 0.318∗
(1.77) (0.65) (1.68)
FDSCORE 20.006 20.010∗∗ 20.001
(21.10) (21.97) (20.11)
FDSCORE × Xt 0.026 0.186∗∗∗ 20.031
(0.44) (3.39) (20.69)
FDSCORE × Xt3 20.066 0.027 20.004
(21.35) (0.99) (20.11)
TIME 0.001 20.006∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(1.51) (210.28) (6.57)
FDSCORE × Xt × TIME 20.001 20.023∗∗ 0.007
(20.05) (22.42) (1.16)
FDSCORE × Xt3 × TIME 0.013∗∗ 0.006 0.016∗∗∗
(2.26) (0.79) (3.15)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Observations 2831 1526 1305
Adj. R2 0.1369 0.1228 0.1475
Notes: The sample consists of 2831 observations during the period 1996–2007 for a sample of 394 UK listed non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms with at least ﬁve years available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S.
Appendix 2 deﬁnes the variables. High (low) earnings quality includes ﬁrm-year observations where EQ (inverse
measure of earnings quality) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. TIME is a trend variable equal to the
difference between the current year and 1996. We report the coefﬁcient estimates from OLS regressions of annual
stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the frequency of forward-looking performance
statements and a time trend. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and ﬁrm to
control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.
∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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earnings quality, such as ﬁnancial analyst coverage or the analyst forecast dispersion, do not
appear to affect investors reliance on FLPDs. Overall, these results reafﬁrm our conclusion that
investor reliance on FLPDs increases with earnings quality in the presence of situational incen-
tives, lending further credence to the use of earnings quality as a gauge of management credibility.
5.4.2. Forecasting versus reporting reputation
While it is hard to monitor the accuracy of FLPDs due to their qualitative nature, over time inves-
tors could learn to estimate the extent to which FLPDs map into future operating performance.
This is possible through cumulative learning over time, which generates priors for corporate dis-
closure behaviour and allows for persistence to be built into these priors (Holland 2005). If an
evaluation of the ﬁrm’s forecasting reputation is feasible in the long term, investor conﬁdence
in management disclosures will rise over time. To test this assertion, we examine whether investor
reliance on FLPDs increases over time for a balanced sample of ﬁrms with at least ﬁve years of
being listed and therefore a sufﬁcient record of annual reports. To capture inter-temporal variation
in the relevance of FLPDs we introduce a time trend, TIME, and interact it with both
FDSCORE× Xt and FDSCORE × Xt3. To the extent that investor reliance on FLPDs rises
with the track record of annual report narratives, we expect the interaction term to be positive.
Table 6 reports the regression results for the balanced sample. As expected,
FDSCORE× Xt3 × TIME is positive and signiﬁcant (0.013, t = 2.26), suggesting that reliance
on FLPDs to anticipate future earnings increases over time.
To the extent that management forecasting and reporting reputation are alternative cues of
management credibility, relying on a track record of annual narratives to evaluate management’s
forecasting reputation will be more pronounced within ﬁrms with a poor reputation for the quality
of their reported earnings. To test this assertion, we repeat the analysis distinguishing between
ﬁrms with high and low earnings quality. The next two columns of Table 6 report the regression
results. FDSCORE× Xt3 × TIME is indeed positive and signiﬁcant only for ﬁrms with low earn-
ings quality.22 Thus, for ﬁrms facing issues with ﬁnancial reporting quality, investors rely on
FLPDs to anticipate future earnings only with a track record of annual report narratives. We
view these results as reinforcing our core ﬁnding that earnings quality enhances reliance on
FLPDs, shedding light on the compensating effect of time as a means of estimating management
forecasting reputation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the credibility, as perceived by investors, of FLPD provided in annual
reports. We ﬁnd that further to the ﬁrm’s disclosure policy and information environment, the fre-
quency of forward-looking disclosure depends on managerial incentives at the time of the disclos-
ure. Managers seem to be more forthcoming about future performance in their annual reports
during years when the company raises debt or reports bad earnings news in the ﬁnancial state-
ments. In the presence of these managerial incentives, investors do not seem to rely on FLPDs
unconditionally, they use forward-looking disclosure to appraise both current and future perform-
ance only when reported earnings in the audited ﬁnancial statements are of high quality.
Our results have important implications for managers and policy-makers. For managers, they
provide insights into the strategies they might follow to increase the extent to which stock prices
capture their private information discussed in the narratives. Developing a reputation for high
quality of earnings in the audited ﬁnancial statements appears to make forward-looking disclosure
more credible to investors. For policy-makers who are considering broadening the scope for dis-
closures of forward-looking information in annual report narratives, our evidence suggests that
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investors mitigate the risk of resource misallocation by using information on the ﬁrm’s earnings
quality. A further important insight from our ﬁndings is that the drivers and usefulness of volun-
tary disclosure, especially of ‘soft’, unveriﬁable information, cannot be examined in isolation
from the contents and properties of mandatory reporting. There is a meaningful interaction
between the front end of the ﬁnancial reports and the ﬁnancial statement that could enhance
our understanding of managers’ disclosure choices and offer guidance to regulators on how to
improve corporate reporting.
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Notes
1. Recent research relies heavily on computer software packages to measure levels of narratives disclos-
ures. These include Kothari et al. (2009), Feldman et al. (2010), Brown and Tucker (2011), Gruning
(2011) and Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012). For an extensive review of the use of computer-based
content analysis to measure levels of disclosure, see Li (2010b). We focus on forward-looking earnings
statements within narrative disclosures.
2. On the determinants of forward-looking disclosure some evidence is also provided by studies focusing
on the ‘tone’ of forward-looking disclosures. Li (2010a) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with better current
performance, smaller size, less return volatility and lower market-to-book ratios issue more positive
forward-looking disclosures. Since we examine factors inducing managers to be more forward
about future performance in their reports, we focus on the frequency forward-looking disclosures.
3. For completeness, we reafﬁrm the information content of FLPDs by examining their predictive ability
for future performance. We conﬁrm that FLPDs, and annual changes in FLPDs, are positively associ-
ated with future changes in proﬁtability.
4. The Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) produced the AIMR-FAF ratings by evaluating ﬁrms’ dis-
closures along three dimensions: (a) the detail of information disclosed in annual published reports,
(b) the detail of information in quarterly reports and (c) the responsiveness and openness of manage-
ment to analyst questions. These ratings covered all the various disclosures made by ﬁrms, including
verbal information given during analyst meetings and conference calls. However, prior research using
these ratings argues that it is not clear how analysts selected ﬁrms to be included in the ratings,
suggesting the existence of a strong bias towards the largest ﬁrms in each industry sector. The FAF
discontinued the ratings in 1995.
5. Investors may assess the credibility of management forecasts through ex post realisations. Consistent
with this notion, prior research ﬁnds that investors rely on earnings forecasts more when ﬁrms have
provided accurate forecasts in the past (Williams 1996, Hirst et al. 1999, Mercer 2004, Rogers and
Stocken 2005).
6. Analyst reports are highly likely to include the topics that help the stock market to anticipate future
earnings changes. This is due to ﬁnancial analyst representing and inﬂuencing investor beliefs
(Schipper 1991, Lang and Lundholm 1996) and to annual reports serving as a key input to drafting
analyst reports. Relying on analysts’ views, as representative of the market’s view, about the ﬁrm’s
disclosure policy is also consistent with the use of AIMR-FAF ratings as a proxy for the ﬁrm
disclosures.
7. As our analysis focuses on the frequency of FLPDs, i.e. how forthcoming managers are about the
future, and not their content, we do not perform extensive content analysis on FLPDs. To assess con-
sistency with prior literature, we only draw some general observations about the content. In our ran-
domly selected statements, consistent with the evidence of Clarkson et al. (1992), Clarkson et al.
(1994), and Clatworthy and Jones (2003), good news appears to dominate bad news. Of the randomly
selected sample statements, 95% contain good news about the future. Only a few of these statements
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contain a mixture of good and bad news. The bad news component refers to current or past events,
leading to the good news component with a forward-looking perspective.
8. According to the proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1986, Darrough and Stoughton 1990,
Wagenhofer 1990) the incentive to voluntarily disclosure information is a decreasing function of pro-
prietary costs such as competitive costs. Consistent with this theory, Jones (2007) ﬁnds that higher
proprietary costs are associated with lower levels of R&D voluntary disclosure. Prencipe (2004)
ﬁnds that proprietary costs also limit the incentive for companies to provide segment information to
the market.
9. Barclay and Smith (1995), McLaughlin et al. (1998), Barth and Kasznik (1999) and Huddart and Ke
(2007) use the book to market measure as a proxy for information asymmetry.
10. The framework of this model has its theoretical underpinning in the discounted cash ﬂows valuation
model, assuming that investors’ revisions in dividend expectations are fully summarised by their revi-
sions in future earnings expectations.
11. Collins et al. (1994) include errors-in-variables proxies such as lagged earnings yield, current asset
growth and future period returns to mitigate the measurement error problems. They argue that the
inclusion of such proxies will affect the goodness of ﬁt of the model only if the reason for the poor
performance of the simple return-earnings regression is prices leading earnings. Panel C of Table 1
shows that the correlations between these variables are relatively small, with the largest correlation
being between future earnings and future returns (35%). Such a correlation is anticipated (Lev 1989).
12. We focus on the standard deviation of the model residuals, as in Dechow and Dichev (2002). We repeat
the analysis using the average of the model residuals and obtain qualitatively similar results.
13. For years beginning on or after 1 October 2007, UK quoted companies follow the enhanced business
review reporting requirements of section 417 of the Companies Act 2006. Section 417 sets out the
required contents of the business review, which companies need to include as part of their director’s
report. The content of the business review overlaps considerably with the content of the OFR,
which constitutes a substantial part of the UK annual report narratives.
14. When using the unscaled FDSCORE, simply counting the frequency of FLPDs in the annual report, we
also document a positive association with SIZE.
15. The negative association remains when using alternative measures of size based on ﬁrm sales or total
assets.
16. With respect to equity offerings we also test the variation in FDSCORE in the year prior to equity offer-
ings, i.e. redeﬁning SEO as an indicator of increases in equity in the following period. In this additional
test the effect of equity offerings is insigniﬁcant. For US ﬁrms, Lang and Lundholm (2000) also ﬁnd no
change in the frequency of forward-looking statements prior to equity offerings and attribute this to the
SEC explicitly discouraging forecasts prior to registering the offering.
17. Causality may be an issue with analyst following, as it may be that ﬁrms issuing more FLPDs have
lower information acquisition costs and therefore attract more ﬁnancial analysts. To mitigate this
concern, we repeat the analysis adding lagged NANAL and the effect remains positive and signiﬁcant.
18. Since BMt and BMt21 are highly correlated we scrutinised collinearity diagnostics for this speciﬁca-
tion. Both the variance inﬂation factors and the tolerance levels of these and all remaining variables
where at acceptable levels (below 3 and 0.9, respectively) alleviating collinearity concerns.
19. The remaining ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, e.g. DISPERSION, LOSS and EQ do not signiﬁcantly
affect FLPDs in any of the speciﬁcations. In a speciﬁcation excluding industry dummies EQ is signiﬁ-
cant and with the predicted sign. The effect of LOSS is subsumed by DECLINE and MISS, as losses
are highly correlated with declines in proﬁtability and the missing of analyst forecasts.
20. Collins et al. (1994) predict a negative coefﬁcient for Rt3 and AGt and positive coefﬁcients for EPt21,
as EPt21 (Rt3 and AGt) is (are) negatively (positively) associated with expected future earnings growth
and the measurement error proxies serve to subtract the noise element from realised earnings growth.
Similar to Hussainey et al. (2003), we document a positive, instead of negative, coefﬁcient on AGt.
21. Bid-ask spreads have also been found to be negatively associated with ﬁrm disclosures (Healy and
Palepu 2001), offering an alternative inverse proxy for disclosure quality. However, as they are directly
associated with stock returns, we do not use them in our additional tests so that the results are not
hardwired.
22. We note that FDSCORE × Xt× TIME is negative for ﬁrms with high earnings quality, suggesting that
investor reliance on FLPDs to reassess contemporaneously reported earnings declines over time for
these ﬁrms. This might reﬂect the declining scope for using FLPDs to explain contemporaneous per-
formance for ﬁrms whose reported earnings are already of high quality.
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Appendix 1. FLPDs
Stages for constructing index of FLPD FDSCORE.
Stage 1: Identifying forward-looking keywords.
Accelerate Estimate Next Scope for, scope to
Anticipate Eventual Novel Shall
Await Expect Optimistic Shortly
Coming (ﬁnancial) years Forecast Outlook Should
Coming months Forthcoming Planned, planning Soon
Conﬁdence, conﬁdent Hope Predict Will
Convince Intend, intention Prospect Well placed, well positioned
Current (ﬁnancial) year Likely, unlikely Remain Year(s) ahead
Envisage Look forward, look ahead Renew
Stage 2: Identifying performance-related keywords from analyst reports.
Beneﬁt Contribution Loss Proﬁtability
Break even Earnings Margin Return
Budget EPS Proﬁt Trading
Stage 3: Counting the intersections between forward-looking and performance-related keywords, scaling the
intersections by the total number of sentences in the annual report and multiplying by 100.
Sample of forward-looking performance statements
Statement Source (year of annual report)
‘Management is conﬁdent that, with the launch of its new division “The
Film Factory at VTR”, the company is now well placed to capture a
large stake of these special effects commercials and feature ﬁlm market
which will ensure the company’s continuing growth in proﬁtability’
VTR PLC (1996)
‘Of the three divisions, RCO Healthcare is attracting the highest level of
investment and offers considerable prospects for good returns in the
medium and long term’
RCO Holdings PLC (1996)
‘We intend to increase proﬁts both by a controlled programme of organic
expansion and by improving the performance of the existing units’
Vardon PLC (1996)
‘We believe that the restructuring and investment programme will restore
proﬁtability to the group and strengthen our position in the market
place’
Stoddard Sekers International
PLC (1996)
‘Its merger into Montgomery will provide an opportunity for proﬁts
recovery in future years’
Macfarlane Group (Clansman)
PLC (1996)
‘We will continue to invest to improve the business and to translate the
many opportunities available to us into good returns for our
shareholders’
FirstBus PLC (1997)
‘The Directors believe that the company is now well positioned to
support further growth which should result in a consequent
improvement in operating margin’
Stoves Group PLC (1997)
‘Going forward, Cantab will retain key commercial rights to provide both
ﬂexibility and greater ﬁnancial return’
Cantab Pharmaceuticals PLC
(1997)
‘Importantly, we expect to produce solid proﬁts and cash ﬂow above the
norms of our competition, whilst maintaining our capability to take
advantage of improving markets’
Abacus Polar PLC (1997)
‘I am conﬁdent that our carefully targeted expansion programmes across
all our businesses will result in strong growth in earnings for the future’
Stagecoach Holdings PLC (1997)
(Continued)
256 V. Athanasakou and K. Hussainey
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
6:1
8 2
3 M
ay
 20
14
 
Sample of forward-looking performance statements
Statement Source (year of annual report)
‘As with our previous acquisitions we expect them to beneﬁt from being
part of McBride and to be earnings enhancing during the forthcoming
year’
McBride PLC (1998)
‘Superscape will invest these funds to continue to grow the company and
move towards proﬁtability’
Superscape VR PLC (1998)
‘We are looking forward to the years ahead and are conﬁdent of
generating major rights assets and of producing signiﬁcant growth in
earnings’
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
(1998)
‘The development programme will concentrate primarily on large
capacity key sites in high proﬁle locations which have the potential
individually to generate proﬁts well in excess of the average bar or
nightclub’
Chorion PLC (1998)
‘Our focus on sales will ensure that the Group produces revenue growth
and a return to proﬁt and thus progressively build value for our
shareholders’
IES Group PLC (1999)
‘To match this investment in technology, we have also increased our sales
and marketing activities and expect to see the beneﬁts coming through
in the near future’
Dee Valley Group PLC (1999)
‘We believe that such opportunities combined with our reorganised UK
operations will lead to improved levels of proﬁtability’
Liberfabrica PLC (1999)
‘A consistent focus on service quality, at sustainable margins, will
contribute to long term proﬁtable growth in this business’
Go Ahead Group PLC (1999)
‘Future prospects look encouraging and we intend to take advantage of
every opportunity to increase Group proﬁts and earnings, and enhance
value to shareholders’
Columbus Group PLC (1999)
‘However, the situation is now improving signiﬁcantly and the company
is moving towards proﬁt and regaining the conﬁdence of its retail and
contract customers’
Mcbride PLC (2000)
‘The winning of new contracts and the maintenance of existing
relationships will ensure that SSS continues its positive contribution to
the Group’
IES Group PLC (2000)
‘It is our intention to continue to expand the sales of our testing services,
which will bring the beneﬁts of greater ﬂexibility and additional
income’
Dee Valley Group PLC (2000)
‘Thus the Group is well placed for further acquisitions and proﬁt growth
in the future’
Beale PLC (2000)
‘Demand for our products remains buoyant and I am conﬁdent that the
addition of further CD and DVD case capacity in the coming months
should provide the opportunity to further increase turnover and
proﬁtability’
Coral Products PLC (2000)
‘We shall be actively exploiting new growth opportunities to enhance the
Group’s proﬁtability’
Stoves Group PLC (2000)
‘The business is building but will inevitably take time to achieve an
acceptable return’
Burnden Leisure PLC (2001)
‘We expect there to be beneﬁts from increased capacity and improved
efﬁciency’
W T Foods PLC (2001)
‘The Board is conﬁdent that the enlarged estate will continue to produce
substantial returns in the years ahead’
Fuller Smith & Turner PLC
(2001)
(Continued)
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Sample of forward-looking performance statements
Statement Source (year of annual report)
‘We are conﬁdent that our signiﬁcant investment in ﬁltration and our
strategic strengths will produce a good and increasing return for
shareholders, and a rewarding environment for our employees and
customers’
Mcleod Russel Holdings PLC
(2001)
‘Over the short term, proﬁt growth will be constrained by the cost of
investment’
Boots Company PLC – (2002)
‘This was achieved despite signiﬁcant revenue investment in areas such
as the Argos store card and new products at Experian, which will
underpin future proﬁts growth’
Great Universal Stores PLC
(2002)
‘We shall continue our ongoing strategy of using this surplus to buy back
shares, in order to enhance long term growth in earnings per share’
Next PLC (2002)
Appendix 2. Deﬁnition of variables (in alphabetical order)
Variable Deﬁnition
AG The growth rate of total book value of assets in period t
BM Book (DS307) to market (DSHMV) ratio. HMV is the item code for the market
value of equity.
CFO Operating cash ﬂows (DS1015) scaled by lagged total assets
DEBTISSUES Equals one if total debt (DS1301) increases by more than 5% during the year,
zero otherwise
DECLINE Equals one if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is negative, zero otherwise
DISPERSION Standard deviation of analyst forecasts during the accounting period scaled by
the absolute value of actual earnings
EP I/B/E/S reported actual EPS for year t 2 1 divided by beginning of year share
price
EQ The standard deviation of a ﬁrms’ abnormal working capital accruals calculated
over years t 2 4 through t. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the
modiﬁed Jones (1991) model extended with return on assets (Kothari et al.
2005), and negative changes in cash ﬂows to account for the role of accruals
in timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Working capital
accruals measured as change in total current assets (DS376) net of change in
cash (DS375), minus change in current liabilities (DS389) net of change in
the current portion of long-term debt (DS309)
FDSCORE The number of forward-looking performance statements included in the annual
report narratives divided by the total number of sentences in the annual report
narrative sections and multiplied by 100
LOSS Equals one if in I/B/E/S actual EPS is negative in the current accounting period,
0 otherwise
MISS Equals one if the earnings surprise (SURP) is negative, zero otherwise
NANAL Number of analysts following the ﬁrm over the accounting period (source: I/B/
E/S)
UNDERPERFORMANCE Average industry return on assets (ROA) minus ﬁrm-speciﬁc ROA. ROA is
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (DS1502) over
total assets (DS392)
UNDERPERFORM Equals one if UNDERPERFORMANCE is positive (i.e. the ﬁrm underperforms
compared its industry peers), 0 otherwise
(Continued)
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Variable Deﬁnition
Rt Buy-and-hold returns from eight months before end of ﬁnancial year t to four
months after the end of ﬁnancial year t
Rt3 Buy-and-hold returns from eight months before the ﬁnancial year-end to four
months after the ﬁnancial year-end for years t + 1 to t + 3
SEO Equals one if the share capital (DS301) increases by more than 5% during the
year, zero otherwise
SIZE Log of market value of equity (DSHMV)
SURP Earnings surprise calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and
the forecast outstanding at the earnings announcement date for year t
Xt The annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS from year t to t + 1 scaled by the
stock price at the beginning of the year t
Xt3 The sum of annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS for years t + 1 to t + 3 scaled
by the stock price at the beginning of the year t
sSALES The standard deviation of total sales (DS104) over the accounting periods over
years t 2 2 through to t
Note: DS, Datastream code.
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